Essays and Discussions
Topic: Is the Downsian model of the behaviour of political parties an adequate explanation of the functioning of modern party political systems?
Length: 1474 Words
To answer the question we must first define the key terms presented in the question. The ‘Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics’ describes a party system as being “the set of all the significant parties in a country, their interactions, and (sometimes) the electoral system and voter loyalties that produce it” (McLean and McMillan, 2003, p398). A similar definition is offered in ‘Comparative Government and Politics (6th Edition)’, “A party system denotes the interaction between the significant political parties. In a democracy, parties respond to each others initiatives in competitive interplay. The party system also reflects legal regulation applying to all parties” (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p194). Both definitions suggest that a defining feature of a party system is how the (significant) parties that make up that system interact with each other. This interaction, through development of party policy to reaction to rival party policy is a fundamental aspect of the workings of Anthony Down’s Economic Theory of Democracy or more simply the Downsian Model. Downs himself regarded a party as being “a team of people seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197). It is the objective of this essay to explore the key elements of the Downsian model, evaluate evidence that reinforces and questions the validity of this model and finally to conclude as to whether the Downsian model can be regarded as an adequate explanation of the behaviour of model party political systems.
Downs theorized that there are many parallels between Electoral Systems and Market Economies. In a market economy free of a perfect monopoly each consumer has freedom to choose a good or service from a variety of businesses, each offering a slightly different good or service. Assuming that each consumer is motivated selfishly and rationally then the consumer will pick the product which most suits their own satisfaction. Downs suggested that voters will act the same way, electing for parties whose policies are most likely to benefit them. Thus if every voter acted in this way then the largest demographic would be where the most votes can be won. (Figure 1) shows a ‘bell curve’ of a typical liberal democracy, with the most votes being ‘available’ to parties in the centre of the spectrum, parties with liberal policies.
Now assuming that “in a political market, parties act in a rational, self interested way” (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197) then we can assume that the far majority of parties will attempt to increase the percentage of the electorate that will vote for them in order to control more power in office, “To maximize their control over the government, parties seek to maximize their vote, even in a multi party system” (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197). If parties become conscious that there are more votes available in a certain area of the political spectrum then Downs theorises that those parties will shape their policies to appeal from voters from that area of the spectrum much in the same way a business designs its product to attract demand from a large market segment. “The more votes a party wins, the more chance it has to enter a coalition, the more power it receives if it does enter one and the more individuals in it hold office in the government coalition. Hence vote-maximizing is still the best motive underlying the behaviour of political parties.” (Downs, 1957, p.159).
Hague and Harrop describe the evidence supporting such behaviour as being “legion” (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197). They point to Bill Clinton’s Democrats and Tony Blair’s New Labour, two leaders who steered their parties towards the centre of the political spectrum from their left wing heritage. Meanwhile in ‘Coalition Governments in Western Europe’ Wolfgang C. Muller and Kaare Strom stated that around half of the parties in countries they used in case studies obviously used a strategy of vote maximization, while this hardly sounds conclusive only three parties acted with policy influence as their primary objective (Müller and Strøm, 1999, p.305). Policy influence being the objective that most academics who disagree with Downs usually rely on, such as Riker and De Swann.
In many political systems campaign funds are distributed depending on the share of the vote each party received during the last election, this further entices parties to become vote maximizes as the larger the share of the vote the more chance they will be able to win the next election (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197).
However if evidence supporting the Downsian model is ‘legion’ then the mass of theory against is far from unsubstantial. A common argument against the ‘economic theory’ is that “parties seek to ‘shape’ or mobilise public opinion as well as respond to it” (Heywood, 1997, p234) that is to say that parties do not merely adapt them selves to suit the voters vision of their ideal choice but rather aim to inform the voter that they are the most sensible choice for a wider range of voters. This is certainly more likely the case in two party systems where the amount of votes received is not proportional to the offices won. Consider the US Presidential Elections, in the 2000 election Al Gore’s Democrats beat George W. Bush’s Republicans in the popular vote by 50,999,897 to 50,456,002 yet lost the election by 266 electoral college votes against Bush’s 271 (BBC News, 2004). This suggests that party’s should not aim to maximize their vote but merely defeat their opponents in an effort to get into office (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197). As William Riker set out to prove in his book ‘The Theory of Political Coalitions’, “Downs assumed that political parties seek to maximize votes. As against this, I shall attempt to show that they seek to maximize only the subjective certainty of winning” (Riker, 1962, p33).
The question is also raised whether voters are well informed enough to be able to judge correctly their own best interests (Heywood, 1997, p234). “[Voters] are influenced by a range of ‘irrational’ factors such as habit, social conditioning, the image of the parties and the personalities of their leaders” (Heywood, 1997, p222). Heywood goes on to suggest that in the political market it is not solely the type of ‘good’ that will attract a voter but the way these goods are solid through advertising, political campaigning and propaganda (Heywood, 1997, p223), therefore a party with a traditionally large electoral base in a system where campaign funds are allocated by share of the vote a party will be able to attract voters to their party without having to adjust their ideological position.
Furthermore the model assumes that even if the entire voting populace was correctly aware of the party whose policies would most likely or most greatly profit them then this is the party they will vote for. It is likely that not every voter will act in a rational and self-interested way (Sodaro, 2001, p246); it is likely that a sizeable minority of voters are more interested with the well being of society as a whole over their own needs or wants.
Also it is apparent that in liberal democracies the majority of the voting population will vote for liberal parties and that’s why other parties ‘swing’ to the centre. Yet why don’t party’s already in the centre already a large voter base already? Considering Labours movement towards in centre in the 1992 election campaign why have the Liberal Democrats, already the most liberal party in the UK never held office since 1906? Clearly more doubt is thrown onto the success of the Downsian Model describing the behaviour of parties in a two party system.
An alternative view to the primary objective of parties being to maximize votes or even to hold office is that they may solely wish to influence policy whether they hold office or not (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197). In two party systems this is illustrated by the wide variety of smaller parties who stand little chance of holding office during national elections or even at local level, if they are merely able to exist and inform the voting public then it is likely that the government will have to acknowledge the views of the party and their supporters. However a fringe party with more votes will have a larger voice than one without votes (eg UK, Green Party compared to British National Party), this suggests they will want to vote maximize.
Weighing the two views against each other it becomes apparent that while being a simple model of behaviour and able to be discredited the Downsian Model is a largely accurate and realistic theory of party behaviour. While some opposing views are outlined in this essay it is relatively easy to construct counter arguments. In theory and practice Down’s ‘Economic Theory’ is an adequate explanation of the behaviour of political parties.
Bibliography
Downs, A.
An Economic Theory of Democracy
New York, Harper & Row, 1957
Hague, R. and Harrop, M.
Comparative Government and Politics 6th Edition
New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004
Heywood, A.
Macmillan Foundations, Politics
London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997
McLean, I. and McMillan, A.
Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003
BBC News.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/americas/04/vote_usa/map/html/default.stm
Müller, W. and Strøm, K.
Coalition Governments in Western Europe
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999
Riker, W.
The Theory of Political Coalitions
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962
Sodaro, M.
Comparative Politics – A Global Introduction
New York, McGraw-Hill, 2001
(c)2004 Dave Randall
Length: 1474 Words
To answer the question we must first define the key terms presented in the question. The ‘Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics’ describes a party system as being “the set of all the significant parties in a country, their interactions, and (sometimes) the electoral system and voter loyalties that produce it” (McLean and McMillan, 2003, p398). A similar definition is offered in ‘Comparative Government and Politics (6th Edition)’, “A party system denotes the interaction between the significant political parties. In a democracy, parties respond to each others initiatives in competitive interplay. The party system also reflects legal regulation applying to all parties” (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p194). Both definitions suggest that a defining feature of a party system is how the (significant) parties that make up that system interact with each other. This interaction, through development of party policy to reaction to rival party policy is a fundamental aspect of the workings of Anthony Down’s Economic Theory of Democracy or more simply the Downsian Model. Downs himself regarded a party as being “a team of people seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197). It is the objective of this essay to explore the key elements of the Downsian model, evaluate evidence that reinforces and questions the validity of this model and finally to conclude as to whether the Downsian model can be regarded as an adequate explanation of the behaviour of model party political systems.
Downs theorized that there are many parallels between Electoral Systems and Market Economies. In a market economy free of a perfect monopoly each consumer has freedom to choose a good or service from a variety of businesses, each offering a slightly different good or service. Assuming that each consumer is motivated selfishly and rationally then the consumer will pick the product which most suits their own satisfaction. Downs suggested that voters will act the same way, electing for parties whose policies are most likely to benefit them. Thus if every voter acted in this way then the largest demographic would be where the most votes can be won. (Figure 1) shows a ‘bell curve’ of a typical liberal democracy, with the most votes being ‘available’ to parties in the centre of the spectrum, parties with liberal policies.
Now assuming that “in a political market, parties act in a rational, self interested way” (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197) then we can assume that the far majority of parties will attempt to increase the percentage of the electorate that will vote for them in order to control more power in office, “To maximize their control over the government, parties seek to maximize their vote, even in a multi party system” (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197). If parties become conscious that there are more votes available in a certain area of the political spectrum then Downs theorises that those parties will shape their policies to appeal from voters from that area of the spectrum much in the same way a business designs its product to attract demand from a large market segment. “The more votes a party wins, the more chance it has to enter a coalition, the more power it receives if it does enter one and the more individuals in it hold office in the government coalition. Hence vote-maximizing is still the best motive underlying the behaviour of political parties.” (Downs, 1957, p.159).
Hague and Harrop describe the evidence supporting such behaviour as being “legion” (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197). They point to Bill Clinton’s Democrats and Tony Blair’s New Labour, two leaders who steered their parties towards the centre of the political spectrum from their left wing heritage. Meanwhile in ‘Coalition Governments in Western Europe’ Wolfgang C. Muller and Kaare Strom stated that around half of the parties in countries they used in case studies obviously used a strategy of vote maximization, while this hardly sounds conclusive only three parties acted with policy influence as their primary objective (Müller and Strøm, 1999, p.305). Policy influence being the objective that most academics who disagree with Downs usually rely on, such as Riker and De Swann.
In many political systems campaign funds are distributed depending on the share of the vote each party received during the last election, this further entices parties to become vote maximizes as the larger the share of the vote the more chance they will be able to win the next election (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197).
However if evidence supporting the Downsian model is ‘legion’ then the mass of theory against is far from unsubstantial. A common argument against the ‘economic theory’ is that “parties seek to ‘shape’ or mobilise public opinion as well as respond to it” (Heywood, 1997, p234) that is to say that parties do not merely adapt them selves to suit the voters vision of their ideal choice but rather aim to inform the voter that they are the most sensible choice for a wider range of voters. This is certainly more likely the case in two party systems where the amount of votes received is not proportional to the offices won. Consider the US Presidential Elections, in the 2000 election Al Gore’s Democrats beat George W. Bush’s Republicans in the popular vote by 50,999,897 to 50,456,002 yet lost the election by 266 electoral college votes against Bush’s 271 (BBC News, 2004). This suggests that party’s should not aim to maximize their vote but merely defeat their opponents in an effort to get into office (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197). As William Riker set out to prove in his book ‘The Theory of Political Coalitions’, “Downs assumed that political parties seek to maximize votes. As against this, I shall attempt to show that they seek to maximize only the subjective certainty of winning” (Riker, 1962, p33).
The question is also raised whether voters are well informed enough to be able to judge correctly their own best interests (Heywood, 1997, p234). “[Voters] are influenced by a range of ‘irrational’ factors such as habit, social conditioning, the image of the parties and the personalities of their leaders” (Heywood, 1997, p222). Heywood goes on to suggest that in the political market it is not solely the type of ‘good’ that will attract a voter but the way these goods are solid through advertising, political campaigning and propaganda (Heywood, 1997, p223), therefore a party with a traditionally large electoral base in a system where campaign funds are allocated by share of the vote a party will be able to attract voters to their party without having to adjust their ideological position.
Furthermore the model assumes that even if the entire voting populace was correctly aware of the party whose policies would most likely or most greatly profit them then this is the party they will vote for. It is likely that not every voter will act in a rational and self-interested way (Sodaro, 2001, p246); it is likely that a sizeable minority of voters are more interested with the well being of society as a whole over their own needs or wants.
Also it is apparent that in liberal democracies the majority of the voting population will vote for liberal parties and that’s why other parties ‘swing’ to the centre. Yet why don’t party’s already in the centre already a large voter base already? Considering Labours movement towards in centre in the 1992 election campaign why have the Liberal Democrats, already the most liberal party in the UK never held office since 1906? Clearly more doubt is thrown onto the success of the Downsian Model describing the behaviour of parties in a two party system.
An alternative view to the primary objective of parties being to maximize votes or even to hold office is that they may solely wish to influence policy whether they hold office or not (Hague and Harrop, 2004, p197). In two party systems this is illustrated by the wide variety of smaller parties who stand little chance of holding office during national elections or even at local level, if they are merely able to exist and inform the voting public then it is likely that the government will have to acknowledge the views of the party and their supporters. However a fringe party with more votes will have a larger voice than one without votes (eg UK, Green Party compared to British National Party), this suggests they will want to vote maximize.
Weighing the two views against each other it becomes apparent that while being a simple model of behaviour and able to be discredited the Downsian Model is a largely accurate and realistic theory of party behaviour. While some opposing views are outlined in this essay it is relatively easy to construct counter arguments. In theory and practice Down’s ‘Economic Theory’ is an adequate explanation of the behaviour of political parties.
Bibliography
Downs, A.
An Economic Theory of Democracy
New York, Harper & Row, 1957
Hague, R. and Harrop, M.
Comparative Government and Politics 6th Edition
New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004
Heywood, A.
Macmillan Foundations, Politics
London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997
McLean, I. and McMillan, A.
Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003
BBC News.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/americas/04/vote_usa/map/html/default.stm
Müller, W. and Strøm, K.
Coalition Governments in Western Europe
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999
Riker, W.
The Theory of Political Coalitions
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1962
Sodaro, M.
Comparative Politics – A Global Introduction
New York, McGraw-Hill, 2001
(c)2004 Dave Randall